This section provides additional information on the CUNY system and the parameters of federal student aid programs during our sample period.
Cost of Attendance (COA) equals allowable living expenses include the cost of books and supplies, room and board, transportation expenses, miscellaneous personal expenses, and dependent care, when applicable.
Estimated living expenses depend on a students' planned housing. Within institutions, students within the same broad category (e.g., full-time freshmen living off campus) are all classified as having the same COA, even if actual living expenses vary substantially across individuals within a given group. Total cost of attendance $9,852 -$21,332 $11,036 -$22,984
Notes: All dollar amounts in nominal terms. Table A .2 displays the minimum and maximum (nominal) Pell Grant awards and Pell Grant eligibility threshold during the years we examine. The relationship between EFC and Pell Grant aid for students eligible for an award that is greater than the minimum and less than the maximum does not vary over the years we examine. As long as a student's COA is greater than her statutory Pell Grant, Pell Grant aid only depends on EFC. For most CUNY students, this constraint is not binding. Students with a zero EFC receive the maximum Pell Grant award. For the 2006-07 through 2008-09 academic years, dependent students and independent students with children would automatically receive a total cost of attendance minus other financial assistance and subsidized loans (e.g., unsubsidized loans can be used to replace EFC). This latter constraint is rarely binding for students in our sample. Thus, a change in subsidized loan eligibility is almost always met with an equivalent and opposite change in unsubsidized loan eligibility, leaving total loan eligibility unaffected.
A.2 Federal Pell Grant Program
As shown in Table A .3, the interest rate on unsubsidized loans was a constant 6.8 percent over the years we examine. Unsubsidized loans start incurring interest immediately, while subsidized loans do not accrue interest as long as the borrower has at least half-time enrollment (6 or more credits attempted in a given semester). The interest rate for subsidized loans after the borrower enters repayment by graduating or dropping below half-time attendance ranged from 6. Notes: Interest rates and origination fees for loans originated in specified academic year. Subsidized loan interest rate is zero while students are enrolled (at least half-time) in college; listed interest rate applicable when borrower enters repayment.
Annual interest rates on taxable money market account and 12 month CD from Table 1197 in the U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 2012; available at: https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/resources/rates/previous.htmlhttps://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s1197.pdf.. Annual interest rates represent average monthly annual interest rate for earliest calendar year contained in the academic year (e.g., 2006 under column 2006-07). Table A .4 provides information on the value of the subsidy students receive when they borrow a subsidized Stafford Loan. The first row represents the funds a student receives at origination if they were to take out a $3500 subsidized loan. Assuming that students immediately invest these funds in a 12-month, 24-month, or 60-month CD carrying the average annual interest rate at that time, the second through fourth columns display the nominal amount the borrower would receive after cashing out the CD. The last three columns display the real return to these investments (in the year that the investment is realized). Even if a student were to plan on attending college for five years and invest their initial subsidized loan in a 60-month CD, they were not guaranteed a positive real return to this investment in every year. , 2006 under column 2006-07) . Second, third, and fourth rows display nominal expected value of loan if invested in CD for specified length. Inflation adjusted return displayed in real dollars at the time that the CD would be redeemed (e.g., the inflation-adjusted return to a $3500 subsidized loan invested in a 5-year CD in 2010 is displayed in 2015 dollars). Un d e rg ra d u a te A n n u a l L o a n L i m i ts a n d R a te s $5,500 (Max. Subsidized= $3,500) $9,500 (Max. Subsidized= $3,500)
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30 -59.9
$6,500 (Max. Subsidized= $4,500) $10,500 (Max. Subsidized= $4,500)
60+
$7,500 (Max. Subsidized= $5,500) $12,500 (Max. Subsidized= $5,500) S u b s i d i z e d interest rate: 6.8% fixed (disbursed on or after July 1 st , 2013 and prior to July 1 st , 2014) Unsubsidized interest rate: 6.8% fixed (disbursed on or after July 1 st , 2006) REQ UIREME N TS:
The following 4 criteria are REQUIR ED in order for the Office of Financial Aid to process your loan within 15 business days. When your application is reviewed and the 4 criteria have not been completed, your application will not be processed. The Office of Financial Aid will NOT return any incomplete applications. Check with the Office of Financial Aid after 15 business days to follow up on your application status.
Have a valid 2013-2014 FAFSA Application ( www.F AFS A.ED.G OV )
Must be a matriculated student, registered for at least 6 credits, within your grade level, per semester during the 2013-2014 academic year
Complete an 'Entrance Counseling' quiz** ( www.S TUD ENTL OA NS.G OV) * You must attach the confirmation page Complete a Master Promissory Note (MPN) ** ( www.S TUD ENTL OA NS.G OV) **Your loan request will be applied to your CUNYfirst account within 15 business days or less.
LOAN E LI GIB IL IT Y DETERM IN A TION:
The approved loan amount will be determined by CUNY's Cost of Attendance (COA), minus the Expected Family Contribution (EFC), which is determined by your FAFSA application for 2013-2014. Any financial aid and scholarships you are awarded will be deducted from your COA.
NOTI FIC AT ION:
Once your loan is processed you should receive an award notification, by mail, from CUNY's University Application Processing Center. If there are any discrepancies on your award notification, you must contact the Office of Financial Aid immediately. Once a disbursement has occurred, you will receive a disclosure statement from the loan servicing agency.
REFUND:
Check Hunter College's 'Schedule of Payments' for loan disbursement dates. Refunds are mailed by check or you can sign up for Direct Deposit, visit www.hunter.cuny.edu/finaid to print the form. Direct Deposit i s strongl y en courag ed because you will get your funds on the same day of disbursement. If your check is mailed, you will get it 3 or 5 days later depending on your local post office. If checks are lost via mail it will take about 4 weeks or longer for you to get a replacement check. All loans will be disbursed in two (2) equal payments, Fall 2013 and Spring 2014. If the student is eligible for a Summer 2013 loan and he/she indicates that they would like to be considered for a Summer disbursement, the loan will be disbursed in three (3) payments, instead of two. **One (1) semester loans will only be processed for graduating students.
Total loan amount requested for the 2013-2014 academic year:
You must round the amount to the nearest whole dollar. .7
.75
.8
.85
.9
Probability Notes: Sample includes non-CUNY community colleges participating in federal student loan programs, excluding the 69 community colleges (containing 3 percent of students) for which we were unable to obtain loan packaging practice information (participation status and enrollment from http://projectonstudentdebt.org/files/pub/CC_participation_status_2013-14.pdf). Federal loan and Pell Grant recipient data from the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data System's 2012-13 Student Financial Aid and Net Price file. Information on whether a given community college offers bachelor's degree programs from the IPEDS 2012-13 Institutional Characteristics file. All statistics are enrollment weighted except for average enrollment and the count of institutions in each category. Associate's degree-seeking students Bachelor's degree-seeking students
Notes: The sample in Columns 3 and 6 includes to first-year CUNY undergraduate degree seeking students from the 2011 entry cohort who first enrolled in an associate degree program (Column 3) or bachelor's degree program (Column 5). Column 1 and 2 samples limited to first-year undergraduate associate's degree seeking students from the 2012 National Postsecondary Student Aid Study (NPSAS) attending public schools that either package student loans (Column 1) or do not package loans (Column 2). Columns 4 and 5 limited to first-year undergraduate bachelor's degree-seeing students from the 2012 NPSAS attending public schools that either package student loans (Column 4) or do not package loans (Column 5). COA represents the total cost of attendance (equal to tuition and fees, books and supplies, and living expenses). Parental education shares may not sum to 1 due to missing values. First generation immigrants are students who were not born in the United States. Second generation immigrants are students who were born in the United States with at least one foreign-born parent. Students with EFC greater than $4,000 from Pell Grant eligibility threshold are excluded. All dollar amounts adjusted to represent constant 2012$. Notes: CUNY undergraduate degree seeking applicants; fall 2007 through fall 2010 cohorts. The sample in Columns 1 through 3 includes one observation per prospective student-application (up to 6 per student) while the Column 4 sample includes one observation per student. Each column within a panel contains estimates from a separate regression. The dependent variable in Panel A is total federal grant aid. The dependent variable in Panels B and C is the probability of enrollment conditional on submitting an application. Clustered standard errors (institution by year) in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. All regressions also include school by year fixed effects and EF C it . Columns 1 through 3 specifications also include school ranking fixed effects. Excluded instruments are
. Students with EFC greater than $4,000 from Pell Grant eligibility threshold are excluded. All dollar amounts adjusted to represent constant 2012$. Notes: First-, second-, and third-year CUNY undergraduate degree seeking students; 2005 through 2011 entry cohorts. Observations missing information on parental education are excluded from the Column 7 sample. Each column within a panel represents estimates from a separate regression. Clustered standard errors (institution by year) in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. All regressions also include controls for degree program (AA versus BA), school by year fixed effects, years since entry fixed effects, and the specified polynomial in EF C it (allowed to vary on either side of the eligibility threshold). The degree of polynomial is chosen to minimize the AIC. Students with EFC greater than $4,000 from Pell Grant eligibility threshold are excluded. All dollar amounts adjusted to represent constant 2012$. (1) First-year students
0.859
Notes: 2SLS estimates of the impact of an additional dollar of Pell Grant aid on borrowing for all students and for wouldbe borrowers. Column 1 sample includes first-year CUNY undergraduate degree seeking students; 2007 through 2011 entry cohorts. Column 2 sample includes second-and third-year CUNY undergraduate degree seeking students; 2005 through 2010 entry cohorts. Each column represents estimates from a separate regression. Clustered standard errors (institution by year) in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. See Table B .3 notes for a list of additional controls. All covariates are fully interacted with indicator for whether a student is attending a school that provides an online application for loans. Four of the 17 CUNY institutions provided an online loan application when the cohorts we study were in school. Excluded instruments are 1[ EF C it < 0] and EF C it × 1[ EF C it < 0] fully interacted with an indicator for attending a school that offers an online loan application. Students with EFC greater than $4,000 from Pell Grant eligibility threshold are excluded. All dollar amounts adjusted to represent constant 2012$. (1) White
Notes: 2SLS estimates of the impact of an additional dollar of Pell Grant aid on borrowing for all students and borrowing for would-be borrowers (Panel A) or credits earned during academic year (Panel B). First-year CUNY undergraduate degree seeking students; 2007 through 2011 entry cohorts. Each column within a panel represents estimates from a separate regression. Clustered standard errors (institution by year) in parentheses; ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, + p<0.1. See Table B .3 notes for a list of additional controls. All covariates are fully interacted with indicator for whether a student is white (Column 1), a first-or second-generation immigrant (Column 2), a dependent student (Column 3), or has a college educated parent (Column 4). Excluded instruments are 1[ EF C it < 0] and EF C it × 1[ EF C it < 0] fully interacted with indicator for having the listed characteristic. Students with EFC greater than $4,000 from Pell Grant eligibility threshold are excluded. All dollar amounts adjusted to represent constant 2012$. Notes: First-year CUNY undergraduate degree seeking students; 2007 through 2011 entry cohorts. E [X] represents the average characteristic among students near the Pell Grant eligibility threshold, estimated via a regression of that characteristic on a quadratic in EF C (allowed to vary on either side of the eligibility threshold). β = E [X|switcher] E [X] represents the relative likelihood that an individual with characteristic X is a switcher. We estimate this term by taking the ratio of the coefficient on 1[ EF C it < 0] from a regression of any borrowing 1[ EF C it < 0] and a quadratic in EF C (allowed to vary on either side of the eligibility threshold) using the full sample to the same coefficient when the sample is limited to students who have characteristic X. E [X|Switcher] = βE [X] . The fourth column displays the p − value from the test of β = 1, which is a test of whether the probability that a switcher has characteristic X significantly differs from the probability that a member of the full sample has characteristic X. Students with EFC greater than $4,000 from Pell Grant eligibility threshold in their first year are excluded. All dollar amounts adjusted to represent constant 2012$.
C Proofs
In this appendix, we verify the solution and predictions of the conceptual framework in Section 4 and Table   2 . Here, we define the more general grant function g (s|EF C) = g + h (s|EF C), in contrast to the treatment of grants in our simplified model presented in the main text that assumes h (s|EF C) = 0. We first show that the solution has the form described in the text. Proofs of the predicted effects of an increase in g that are listed in Table 2 follow directly. This appendix concludes with a demonstration that these predictions still hold in the presence of price effects (i.e., h (s|EF C) > 0).
C.1 Solution of Student's Problem
First, the student's problem has either one or two optima. The strict concavity of u (·), concavity of g (·) and W (·), and convexity of T (·), along with piecewise linearity of the cost of borrowing and the regularity
, imply that the problem is strictly concave in both b and s where differentiable. The proof is trivial except to note that the regularity condition is sufficient because:
Therefore, the problem is concave except for the discontinuity at b = 0. The domain of s is bounded by assumption, which therefore places bounds on b because consumption cannot be negative. Hence, there is at least one solution. The solution will not include b at the lower bound that makes c 0 = 0 because
, which implies that total utility would be increased by raising b above this level. Similarly, s is bounded from above by non-negativity of c 0 and the fact that b is bounded above byb, and the upper bound for s will not be optimal. Any solution for observed students (for whom the lower bound s = 0 is revealed to be suboptimal) satisfies the first order condition with respect to s, and either the first order condition with respect to b, b = 0, or b =b.
Second, the solution is unique with probability one. Because the entire problem would be concave if not for the discontinuity, and because the discontinuity reduces utility for values of b greater than zero, any solution with b < 0 is unique. It may be, however, that an allocation with b > 0 gives the same utility as one with b = 0. If two solutions exist for a given level of EFC and ω we denote the positive debt amount chosen in one solution by b. Because student resources are continuously distributed, b is optimal with probability zero.
Third, the solution takes the monotonically ranked form described in Table 2 . The empirical size (possibly zero) of each group will depend on the parameter values and the distribution of resources among students.
Here we establish the theoretical existence of each group of students and their ranking by resources.
Consider schooling levels satisfying the equation
. Raising s would increase total utility, but lowering b by an amount that causes the same reduction in c 0 would cause a greater rise in c 1 , implying that a negative value of debt must be optimal. Since b * < 0, κ 0 = κ sub = λ = 0, which implies
. Because this condition contains the derivative of g (s|EF C)
and not its level, small changes in the unconditional level of grants, ∂g, only affect borrowing:
∈ (−1, 0). Note that the optimal allocation responds to ω in the same way that it responds to g: higher values of ω reduce b * and have no effect on s * .
The conditions hold until ω becomes low enough that b * = 0. We label those with resources high enough to induce negative borrowing (i.e. net saving) Group A.
At b * = 0, ∂b * ∂g = 0. We label the mass of students with exactly zero debt as Group B. Differentiation gives:
Denote the optimal schooling choice when b * = 0 as s * 0 (suppressing the arguments of this function to sim-plify notation). If the fixed cost of borrowing is not too large there will be additional groups with positive debt. Students in Group B obtain utility u (ω
. The level of debt for which the two utilities are equivalent is b. If b <b there will be a Group C for which b ∈ b,b . As with Group A,
∂s * ∂g = 0, and
* is strictly decreasing with ω except in the region for which small positive amounts of debt are dominated by zero debt as a result of the fixed cost of borrowing.
As resources continue to fall, b * may rise to the level of b
∂s * ∂g − 1 , and because (2) holds, ∂s * ∂g > 0 as was the case for Group B. The conditions and properties of Groups E and F follow those of Groups A and B, respectively.
C.2 Empirical Predictions
Derivation of the listed implications follows. Denote ω X as the highest value of in each Group X and F (ω) the cumulative distribution function for ω, conditional on g and EF C. The monotonicity of the policy implies that Group F has mass F (ω F ), Group E has mass F (ω E ) − F (ω F ), Group D has mass F (ω D ) − F (ω E ), etc.
Because the policy function is discontinuous, implications are shown for a discrete change in the amount of grant aid received. 
C.3 Price Effects
Increases in Pell Grant aid may also have price effects for some students because those who do not attend full-time in both semesters do not receive grant aid. To see whether the empirical predictions will still hold in the presence of increased price effects we can borrow a common tactic from the optimal taxation literature and write the local linear approximation l (s * |EF C) to the grant function g (s * |EF C) as l (s * |EF C) = g + p (s − s * ). In this function, the slope p describes the grant's incentive to increase schooling effort, and g (s * |EF C) = p. Price effects alter the second prediction in the preceding subsection but not the first or the third:
1. If the fixed cost γ > 0 then b > 0, and an increase in grant aid may lead to a greater than $1 for $1 reduction in loans for borrowers.
The proof above does not rely on the assumption that g (s * |EF C) is constant. Instead of increasing g as in the last two lines of the proof, however, consider increasing p.
How does p affect borrowing? When borrowing satisfies the first-order condition (and for simplicity R = R sub ):
Suppose we are introducing price effects for the first time, such that p = 0 currently. Then ∂b * ∂p < 0, and as before the additional grant aid pushes optimal debt to a dominated level that induces switching out of borrowing entirely. The rest of the proof is unaltered.
Small changes in the amount of conditional grant aid increase the educational attainment of nonthreshold borrowers.
When a student is not at a borrowing threshold, (R sub + κ sub (R m − R sub )) −1 W (s * ) = T (s * |EF C) − g (s * |EF C) = T (s * |EF C) − p. As one would expect, the price effect increases schooling (i.e., an increase in p increases s * ). This can be seen using implicit differentiation on the combined first-order conditions for the non-threshold borrowers:
Grants decrease educational attainment of students whose optimal debt level drops from (weakly) above
b to a positive amount below b.
The proof is unaltered.
